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Women between Tradition and Change:
The Justice and Development Party
Experience in Turkey
ZANA Ç_ITAK & ÖZLEM TÜR
The 2002 elections in Turkey were considered as a political earthquake by many
observers.1 The elections brought to power the Justice and Development Party (JDP –
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and led to the formation of a single-party government
after a long decade of coalition governments. The JDP emerged as the culmination of
tensions between the secular, military-bureaucratic elite and the Islamists in the
1990s. The resulting polarization brought about a series of recommendations to the
coalition government of the Islamist Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan and
the centre-right True Path Party by the National Security Council on 28 February
1997, aiming at curbing the power of political Islam. This ‘post-modern coup’ started
a process of division within the Islamist movement, leading to the formation of the
JDP in August 2001.2 From the beginning, leaders of the party have emphasized that
they have broken away from the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) Movement of
Erbakan, the long-standing leader of the Islamist movement in Turkey. Despite their
Islamist roots, the party elite denied any Islamic credentials and described themselves
as ‘conservative democrats’. This ‘label’ helped place the party into the centre-right of
the Turkish political spectrum and appeal to a larger constituency. At a time when
established political parties were suffering from a legitimacy crisis, exacerbated by the
2001 economic crisis, the JDP found an opportunity to convey the image of a ‘new
and clean’ party. This image was accompanied by a discourse of ‘change’ that
underlined a rupture from their political Islamist legacy. This ‘change’ manifested
itself most strikingly in the party’s pro-EU stance in contrast to Erbakan’s traditional
anti-Western discourse. Thus, in line with the harmonization of Turkish law with the
EU acquis, the JDP embarked on an ambitious political reform programme between
February 2002 and July 2004, continuing the previous coalition government’s
legislative packages. Consequently, following the European Council meeting of 17
December 2004, Turkey started accession talks with the EU on 3 October 2005. As
different from Erbakan’s movement, the JDP has also refrained from a confronta-
tional approach toward the secular establishment and has presented itself as a
legitimate and thus a ‘systemic party’ within the Turkish political scene.
This article aims at examining the extent to which the JDP has been able to
reconcile its claim of change with tradition, two essential themes of its ideological
discourse of conservative democracy. The women question stands as a key parameter
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8 in understanding the JDP’s attempt at balancing tradition and change. Despite the
centrality of the women question, there has been a relative absence of scholarly work
on this subject.3 This article contributes to the literature by concentrating on the
party’s discourse and practice regarding women. It relies on an analysis of the party
ideology as reflected in official party documents as well as party leaders’ statements,
a close scrutiny of the press and field research based on interviews with party
members.4
The JDP Party Programme has a separate heading, ‘Women’, devoted to
explaining JDP’s perception of the women question and their problems. The
programme states that women and their problems – ‘a culmination of long-time
neglect’ – constitute one of the priorities of the party. To mention a few of the broad
recommendations within this framework, women’s participation in public life and
politics is strongly encouraged; the JDP promises to support women’s civil society
organizations; aims at addressing educational activities targeting sexual and
economic exploitation of and violence against women which also involves women’s
suicides and ‘honour’ killings; and, finally, emphasizes the schooling of girls. Some of
the recommendations that have been mentioned in the party programme were
realized to a certain extent: there has indeed been party condemnation of ‘honour’
killings and a special parliamentary commission, headed by one of the JDP’s women
MPs, Fatma Şahin, was established to investigate the causes of the problem and to
suggest solutions.5 In the same way, there has been a nationwide campaign,
including the government agencies, to increase the schooling of girls.6 The JDP
government currently pays a monetary allowance to poor families who are reluctant
to send their children to school. The government pays the money to mothers rather
than fathers and the amount is greater for girls than for boys.
In fact, the most important changes carried out by the JDP regarding women can
be observed in the legal field. Among those, the JDP put into effect an important
reform regarding women’s rights and male–female equality, by amending the 10th
clause of the Constitution. By this amendment, the state became the guarantor of
gender equality. Superiority of international legislation was accepted by making an
addition to Article 90 of the Constitution. With such amendments, the JDP
government has rendered the CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women), which Turkey has signed in 1985,
operational in law.7 It also established ‘family courts’ to deal with issues and cases
regarding the Family Law. It extended the duration of paid leave for working
women after giving birth to 16 weeks. Another change was made in the new Penal
Code that nullified the former code’s provision that pardoned a rape in case that the
raped woman married her rapist; thus it was accepted that marriage would not
cancel criminal responsibility. Besides, the new law requires all municipalities that
have more than 50,000 residents to establish shelter houses for women and children.8
The party’s Women’s Branches stands out as another significant dimension of the
JDP’s stance concerning women. Women’s Branches are vigorously organized
nationwide; there are regular meetings on a monthly basis, bringing together the
heads of women’s branches of all provinces in Ankara. The leaders of the Women’s
Branches take pride in having introduced a form of organization that could serve as
a model for other parties as well. At the micro level, the women’s branches are
organized through neighbourhood representatives, who serve both as agents for






























8 registering new members of the party and communicating the party’s message to the
people and people’s demands to the party. The Women’s Branches of the JDP also
distinguish themselves from other parties through their institutionalized educational/
training activities.9 The party has so far been successful to a great extent in attracting
women into the Women’s Branches, mostly those who were not involved in politics
before. The JDP women10 joined the party mainly on their own initiative, in contrast
to the women members of the Welfare Party and Virtue Party, who were brought
into politics by their husbands/brothers/fathers to help their work, mainly for
logistical support during elections. The percentage of women in the JDP ranks who
have previously worked for the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party is estimated to be
approximately 30 per cent.11 It is important to note that for most of these women the
main reason in joining the party was Erdogan, thanks to his political experience
before and after founding the JDP, his personal life and his humble background.
Most women express their admiration for Erdogan, whom they had closely followed
during his mayorship of _Istanbul. His ‘ability to solve problems’ and his ‘commercial
skills’ seem to have convinced these women that Erdogan alone is the leader that will
finally solve Turkey’s long-standing economic problems. Besides, many women also
are impressed by what they call his ‘honesty’, ‘sincerity’, ‘studiousness’, ‘charisma’,
and ‘leadership’ as well as by his ‘family’. They also underline that Erdogan is ‘one of
them’, in contrast to previous ‘elitist’ politicians. In fact Erdogan stands as a central
figure for the JDP women. Many women claim that they have initially faced
resistance to their participation in politics from the men in the party. Erdogan’s
active encouragement, according to this view, forced many male members of the
party to accept, sometimes reluctantly, working alongside women. At this point, it is
possible to talk about a tension that exists between the party elite and the lower
(male) ranks of the JDP.12
Although these developments have given important opportunities to women, the
JDP does not have a clear guideline vis-à-vis crucial issues concerning women13 –
most prominent being the quota question and the headscarf issue. In this context, it
is possible to understand the quota question within the framework of the JDP’s
reliance on moderate social change or ‘evolution’. Despite its initial support for a
quota system, the JDP soon changed its mind and adopted an anti-quota stance.
Erdogan has recently expressed his opposition to quotas: ‘Are women like tradable
goods to which you can impose a quota? Can there be such a thing? This is
nonsense.’14 Selma Kavaf, the head of the party’s Women’s Branches, justified the
anti-quota policy as follows:
We do not have a positive stance on the women’s quota. We want the women to
climb up the ladder of politics from the bottom to the top, by experiencing each
step and maturing in the process. If not, they will tell you ‘you did not deserve
this post, you are here because of the quota’. . . . The aim is to increase women’s
participation primarily in terms of quality. It cannot be a symbolic presence as
someone’s daughter, someone’s wife. She has to participate actively and work.15
Most women in the party share a similar line of thought. The JDP women
consistently underline that there is no necessity to impose an official quota as there is
already an ‘unofficial quota’ of 30 per cent in the party. Erdogan’s statements that






























8 encourage women’s participation are again emphasized within this context.
16 In any
case, the general belief in the party is that women’s participation and representation
in politics can only occur gradually and cannot be realized by imposition from above
or by such means as quotas; it should be left to time and to the natural and gradual
evolution of society.
The absence of a clear guideline is more obvious in the case of the headscarf
question. The debate over the headscarf is a development especially of the 1990s. It
constituted the main parameter of the polarization in the country that led to the 28
February process, which led to a stricter implementation of the ban on the headscarf
in universities and in the public space. This issue is closely related to women’s
participation in politics and the public sphere at large which was mentioned in the
party programme. The JDP’s women members argue that, contrary to widespread
belief, there is in fact no headscarf problem in society since the veiled and non-veiled
women ‘walk holding hands in the street’.17 According to them, this issue has been
constantly exploited by the politicians and state institutions: the main responsibility
in transforming the headscarf issue into a problem belongs to the military-
bureaucratic elite. However, these women also add that political parties following
the Milli Görüş line have also contributed to the exploitation of this subject and
Erbakan’s name in particular is mentioned as one of the politicians responsible for
the current stalemate. Even though the JDP leadership frequently states that the
headscarf problem is not at the top of their agenda, it remains a major preoccupation
of the JDP. The JDP women consider the headscarf a very important problem,
which awaits a solution. However, they also emphasize, like Erdogan, that the
solution should be found without creating unnecessary tension in society, mainly by
consensus.
On this point, one could observe a certain divergence of view between the JDP
leadership – including women in the upper echelons of the party and the women
MPs – on the one hand, and women in the lower echelons, on the other. The former
believes that the issue will be solved in time and through social or institutional
consensus,18 especially after solving other pending problems such as those in the
economy. One member of the Women’s Branches stated that once the economic
problems decrease, people ‘won’t preoccupy themselves with the other’s personal
priorities’. Women in the lower echelons, however, see the issue as a much more
urgent problem and are more outspoken about it. Nevertheless, they also underline
their confidence in Erdogan’s commonsense attitude to this matter and do not want
to pressurize the party leadership too much. The number of veiled women increases
as one goes down the levels of the party administration as well as the Women’s
Branches.19 That the headscarf is much more of an integral and natural part of the
lives of these women in the lower ranks of the party can explain the divergence
within the party regarding this issue. Thus, the JDP’s present policy regarding
the headscarf has the potential of alienating those women wearing a headscarf since
the JDP women are ‘more demanding’ and are not in politics just for the sake of
providing logistical support to the party, in contrast to the Welfare Party women
who were mostly in politics merely to support men for the ‘sake of Allah’ and
without having any ambition of their own.20 The JDP women are generally more
ambitious and claim that it is necessary to climb up in the party from the very
bottom, by gaining experience gradually at the real heart of politics. They do have a






























8 firm belief in women’s capacity to accomplish difficult tasks, even better than men.
But it remains unclear how the JDP will respond to women’s demands. A member of
the Women’s Branches, who wears a headscarf, stated almost in tears that ‘she is not
sure how she would react if another woman who has not worked enough and who
has not sacrificed as much as she did for the party appears on the candidate list in the
next elections’. Nevertheless, there are also others among the JDP women who are
ready to take their headscarf off ‘as a necessity of politics’ if there is a prospect of
making it to the candidate list.
In any case, there is a great uncertainty about the JDP’s claim that solution of the
economic problems would bring about the solution of other problems, the most
important being the headscarf. It might be that, as Gamze Çavdar argues, the JDP is
relying on gaining more legitimacy through success in economic and democratic
reforms.21 Secondly, it is also unclear how and when the social/institutional
consensus that is presented as a solution will materialize. Given the existence of a
variety of models of state–religion relationship in Europe as well as different policies
regarding the issue of the headscarf in the EU countries, it would be unrealistic for
the JDP to expect that Turkey’s accession to the EU will bring about pressure from
the EU on the secular military-bureaucratic elite to give up its intransigence on the
headscarf ban in the public space. The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR)
silent approval of the French law banning the ‘ostensible religious signs in public
schools’ in January 2004 and its decision in the Leyla Şahin Case in June 2004,22
which rejected the claim that the ban on the headscarf in universities constitutes a
breach of the freedom of religion and conscience, have shown, to the dismay of the
JDP, that the ECHR could not be seen as an ally on this matter. Hence, the
discourse of an ‘institutional/social consensus’ continues to remain as an ambiguous
guideline of policy for the JDP.
Since its foundation in 2001, the JDP has named itself a ‘conservative democratic
party’, thus rejecting the alternative label of ‘Muslim democrat’, à la Christian
Democratic parties in Europe. According to some observers, the rejection of any
Islamic credentials in its official identity was due to the fact that ‘it is not easy to use
the term ‘‘Muslim’’ in a country that has transformed authoritarian secularism into
an official ideology’,23 with the implication that the term ‘conservative democrat’ was
a proxy for ‘Muslim democrat’. While the leader of the party, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, did not give any clear explanation for this rejection of the ‘Muslim
democrat’ label though underlining his disagreement with such a term,24 Yalçın
Akdogan, a close adviser of Erdogan, argues that opting for the name ‘conservative
democrat’ was more appropriate and ‘politically expedient in a country possessing
different religions, sects, and ideologies’. Thus, Akdogan maintains that the term
‘Muslim democrat’ risked sounding too exclusionary and ‘conservative democracy’
was employed to embrace the whole population.25 Accordingly, the JDP is a ‘mass
party built on the foundation of conservatism’.26 In trying to distance itself from
political Islam, ‘conservatism’ served as an innovative shelter for the JDP. Although,
as Sultan Tepe has argued, ‘conservative’ has not been a ‘conventional marker’ in
Turkish politics, it can be seen as a politically expedient label aiming at ‘carving out a
new and safe place in Turkey’s political and ideological space’.27






























8 Similar to its reluctance to be labelled as ‘Muslim democrat,’ the JDP leadership
has been cautious not to look like a cadre party, thus ‘de-emphasizing ideology’.28
Yalçın Akdogan for example refrains from using the word ‘ideology’ to describe
conservative democracy, although he provides a historical sketch of the evolution of
ideologies in general and conservatism in particular in his book.29 One could find, in
fact, a variety of terms that are used to define conservative democracy in this text.
Conservative democracy is considered at times as a ‘political identity’ or an
‘understanding’, at other times as a ‘line of thought’, a ‘form of political thought’, a
‘political style’, or a simply a ‘concept’, but never an ‘ideology’. This could be seen as
a general exercise in caution characterizing the JDP’s attitude toward ideologies. In
line with this attitude, it is striking to observe that both the women MPs of the party
as well as the members of the Women’s Branches frequently state that ‘-isms are dead
in the context of globalization’ and emphasize their dislike of ideologies, including
feminism.
Democracy as outlined in Akdogan’s formulation of conservative democracy is a
regime that should reflect the will of the nation. Accordingly, democracy is an
inclusive regime, the only one capable of providing the mechanisms necessary for
tolerance, dialogue and reconciliation. Therefore, conservative democracy is against
any attempt and understanding of ‘social and political engineering’,30 having as its
ultimate aim, as Sultan Tepe has argued, ‘the closing of the distance between state
and society’.31 The party programme criticizes the majoritarian understanding of
democracy as follows:
To win the competition [in a democratic election] and to come to power does
not render the will of the majority absolute. One of the most valued
characteristics of modern democracy is that the majority can under no
condition make the basic rights and freedoms contingent and that it is always
respectful of the rights and freedoms of those in the minority.32
Nevertheless, the contrast between the discourse and the practice is striking. Despite
all the emphasis on the coexistence of diversity and difference through dialogue and
reconciliation, the JDP’s approach to democracy as manifested in certain specific
issues concerning women has demonstrated rather an understanding of democracy
defined as majoritarian. This limited understanding of democracy has meant two
things. First, the JDP has seen itself as the direct spokesperson for the people/nation,
and therefore the highest authority to take decisions. At this point JDP leaders rely
on their overwhelming parliamentarian majority and they also have a self-perception
as ‘coming from among people’. Thus, the JDP elite see themselves deeply anchored
in society, respectful toward its values and norms, unlike the secular establishment,
and thus could rightly claim to represent the Turkish people and their shared values.
Secondly, the JDP has taken for granted the existence of a set of shared values,
beliefs and needs, which have hitherto remained unfulfilled in the political arena
because of the domination of the military-bureaucratic elite. The JDP government
will finally make sure they respond to the demands of the people and reflect the
people’s beliefs in politics.
The debate on the question of adultery can also be understood in this light. In
September 2004, during the legislation process of the new Penal Code in accordance






























8 with legal harmonization with the EU, the JDP introduced a last-minute bill to re-
criminalize adultery. The old Turkish Penal Code that dated back to 1926 had
accepted adultery by both men and women as a criminal act. With the 1996 and 1998
rulings of the Constitutional Court, first men’s, and then women’s criminal
responsibility in case of adultery were annulled. The JDP’s bill to re-criminalize
adultery envisaged penalization on the basis of complaint by women or men and was
thus defended that it was based on equality, not prejudiced against women.33 The
JDP argued that the bill reflected public opinion and the demands of the majority of
women, despite widespread criticism by women’s associations that it would definitely
work against women. The then minister in charge of women and family, Güldal
Akşit argued that the new law was appropriate because, by ‘taking into account
Turkish traditions’, it envisaged ‘the preservation of social order’.34 In fact, the
protests organized by the Women’s Platform against the proposed change in the
Turkish Penal Code were dismissed unequivocally by Erdogan as ‘marginal’.
There have been some who have marched in Ankara in the name of democracy
in the recent controversy. I was truly sorry on behalf of the Turkish women
when I saw some handbills that went against their traditions and moral values.
We have moral values; I would never applaud those handbills in the name of the
Turkish women. Because the strength of Turkish women derive from these
values. There can be no such understanding that a specific marginal group
represents the power of Turkish women. 52 per cent of Turkey’s population is
made up of women. Among them, there are also those who have set their hearts
on the JDP.35
Erdogan’s attitude can be seen as an example of the JDP’s belief in the existence of
an absolute set of moral values and corollary demands in society and its claim to
know what these are. Therefore, all views that are not in conformity with these
values and demands are seen as marginal. Accordingly, they represent not the
‘Turkish people’, but a small minority, and, more specifically in the case of adultery,
not ‘Turkish women’, but some ‘some marginal women’. The JDP’s claims to act
according to the wishes of Turkish women were based on a survey conducted by the
JDP who claimed to be deeply concerned with the ‘cries’ of the Turkish women.36
Thus, notwithstanding the JDP’s promise to take decisions and make laws in
consultation with civil society organizations,37 the process of amending those articles
of the Turkish Penal Code which deal with adultery excluded women’s organiza-
tions. The final reversal of the proposed bill on 14 September 2004 was itself the
result of the EU’s harsh criticism and pressure and not those of the civil society
organizations.38 Thus, the adultery episode is telling in terms of the contradictions
within the JDP: although they vehemently rejected the typical attitude of the ruling
elite in Turkey, described as ‘sitting around a desk and trying to shape the society’,39
the JDP leaders, as self-proclaimed depositaries of the values and demands of the
society, do not seem to see anything wrong in sitting around a desk and presuming to
know what the women really want.
For the JDP, the society and its needs, wants and values can easily be ascertained:
99 per cent of the Turkish population is Muslim and therefore it is natural that
politics should respond to this in Turkish society. In this context, the conservative






























8 identity of the party puts the JDP in a particularly privileged position as it sees
Turkey’s Islamic heritage as one of the most important components of the value
system.40 One JDP woman MP expressed this ‘natural’ overlap between moral values
and Islam as follows:
I believe that the way to happiness passes through upholding those values that
make us what we are. These values make one happy. Instead of going to a
therapist, I become happy by praying. These values should not be looked down
upon. . . . This is the measure of conservatism for me. We have to adapt to the
modern, contemporary world; we have to preserve the values that make us what
we are.
These women emphasize that they are not against modernity and change. But
because Turkish society is primarily a Muslim society, it is inevitable that the values
that lie at the basis of society originate from Islam.
In a similar manner, the JDP’s claim to know the Turkish people as well as their
values and demands can be observed in relation to the issue of the headscarf. Since
its foundation, the JDP leadership has stated that the headscarf issue does not
constitute their priority and that it should be solved through consensus. This attitude
can be seen as a reflection of the transformation of the Milli Görüş movement in the
post-28 February process. The JDP frequently states that the headscarf issue should
be understood from within the perspective of individual rights and freedoms. One
male MP has stated that ‘even though [veiling] (örtünme) is not one of the five
commandments of Islam, it is an obligation’. What is significant in this context is
that this ‘obligation’ is defined as ‘türban’41 and all other forms of veiling such as
çarşaf42 are considered ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’. Members of the Women’s Branches
often point out that the extent and definition of veiling are clearly set in the Koran
and all other forms are excluded from this definition. As a result, these women
support women’s right to wear the headscarf in the public sphere. However, they
seem reluctant to extend support to women who wear other forms of veiling, since
the latter are seen as ‘not in the religion’, thereby defining what is ‘in religion’ and
what ‘is not’.
Situating itself in a long history of conservative ideology while at the same time
underlining its own local peculiarities shaped by the particular conditions and
historical experience of Turkey, the JDP puts forward conservatism as the aspect
that distinguishes it from other political parties. Accordingly, the centre-right parties
and even the centre-left parties did indeed have a ‘conservative vein’, but what
distinguishes the JDP from them is the fact that conservatism constitutes the main
body of its politics as well as its engine, which is itself understood as a novelty in
Turkish politics. In this respect, the JDP tries to present its conservatism as a
difference not only from the centre-right tradition of the past and present, but also
from the parties that have based their politics on religion, namely the Islamist parties
of the past.43
The female members of the party as well as Akdogan, as the ‘ideologue’ of
conservative democracy, define conservatism as a ‘synthesis of and a fine tuning
between tradition and change’.44 Hence the principle of the Women’s Branches is
stated as ‘adapting ourselves to technological developments and principles of






























8 permanent and inevitable change and transformation simultaneously with the
modern world while at the same time preserving our traditions shaped by antique
civilizations and our societal values’.45 The JDP women are keen on underlining that
they are not against change and modernity but that this change should take place
while preserving essential social values ‘which make us what we are’. Thus, it is
important to understand how, in practice, the conservatism aspect of conservative
democracy strikes a balance between tradition and change regarding the women
question.
The JDP claims to have an evolutionary understanding of change, as different
from the radical, revolutionary approach, which it considers as a typical
characteristic of the social and political engineering attitude. Radical change would
nullify the past, which is something that needs to be preserved. Destruction of ‘the
institutional and conceptual systems’ are considered as ‘treason against the society’,
for one should not deny the values and accomplishments of the past. Modernization
should be carried out without endangering the ‘unitary nature’ of the social
structure.46 Tradition is the main vehicle of preserving this unitary structure of
society through time and across space, of binding individuals together and
establishing social solidarity. It is thanks to the tradition that values of the past
are transmitted to future generations. Tradition consists of three main and
interrelated components: family, Islam and morality.
Family is put at the centre of conservatism. Akdogan sees the family ‘as the value
that is of highest importance to conservatism’. He argues that ‘the dissolution of the
family which is the social institution that has the function of transmitting tradition
and societal values is the most negative aspect of the modern era’.47 Erdogan even
appointed a personal consultant in charge of women and family, Dr Ayşenur
Kurtoglu. Kurtoglu started a project entitled ‘My Family Turkey’ (Ailem Türkiye)
which included the publication of a series of books such as Family Law Guide, Family
Health Guide, A Life on the Same Pillow and Family Home Guide. These books were
meant to provide recommendations and guidance for ‘a healthy family life’. Like
Akdogan, Kurtoglu argued that ‘our highest and the most uncorrupted value is
precisely the family. We should be jealous of the family. It is the institution that we
have to take care of most’.48 For Erdogan, the proposed change concerning adultery
aimed at protecting the institution of family which was ‘a corollary of our
conservatism’.49 In fact, the very timing of the JDP’s attempt to make the adultery a
criminal act, punishable by law, in September 2004, at a time when considerable
progress had been achieved in integration with the EU, demonstrates the JDP’s care
to underline the difference of Turkish society from European societies. For the JDP,
in other words, what distinguishes Turkey from Europe is essentially family and
morality. In this context, Ahmet Taşgetiren, a conservative columnist writing in Yeni
Şafak, a Turkish daily close to the JDP, argued that European societies are
experiencing a moral decline ‘due to extra-marital relations and sexual freedom’.
Thus, this is seen as ‘something unacceptable’ for the Turkish society. As Taşgetiren
himself put it, it is possible to see the JDP’s insistence on penalizing adultery as
‘demonstrating a resistance of difference’, which it defines as the family.50
Second, besides the family, one of the most important components of the value
system inherited from the past is Islam. In this context, Turkey is seen primarily as
part of Islamic civilization. Considering that the official discourse of the Republican






























8 ruling elite, ever since 1923, has been based on Turkey’s Western identity, the
emphasis put by the JDP on Turkey’s Muslim identity is not without consequences
for Turkey’s self-perception and self-definition. In line with this shift in the official
discourse, two women MPs of the JDP have expressed their agreement with
Erdogan’s statement regarding Islam being the most important cement binding the
Turkish nation since ‘99 per cent of the Turkish population is Muslim’. Besides his
role and his various statements regarding the UN-sponsored ‘Alliance of
Civilizations’,51 Erdogan’s statement at the opening ceremony of the new school
year on 18 September 2006 in Antalya placed Turkey without hesitation in the
Islamic civilization. In this statement, Erdogan took pride in increasing the budget of
the Ministry of Education and explained the motivation behind such an increase as
follows: ‘we belong to a civilization whose first command is ‘‘Read!’’’.52 Similarly, in
the Third Congress on Women in Local Government held in Ankara on 27 March
2007, Erdogan stated that there is no status comparable to motherhood and that this
is the reason why ‘our civilization has placed the heaven under the feet of mothers,
and not those of fathers’.53
The JDP claims to reject an understanding of politics that instrumentalizes religion,
as has been done by religious parties of the past. It follows that this understanding has
proved to have harmful consequences both for religion and politics.54 However,
religion is one of the most cherished values of the conservatism of the JDP. It has been
constantly emphasized that religion constitutes a major social value. In Akdogan’s
formulation of conservative democracy, religion is important for Turkey’s social
structure as well as its geopolitics. Accordingly, not only is religion an important
source of identity, it is also considered as a source of motivation in order to mobilize
human resources for modernization. Religion and freedom of religion and conscience
are also considered as crucial components of democratic regimes. In addition, religion
is seen in functional terms as a social bulwark against the dangerous influences
originating from radicalism and terrorism and serves to create awareness of moral
values and virtue in order to build social order and unity.55
Third, moral values are another crucial element of tradition. The JDP women
have a tendency to closely link Islam and morality. They see it as important to live in
a morally upright society, for which they consider Islam the basis. However, the key
role in the creation and continuity of a morally upright society is accorded to women
because women, in their capacity as mothers, will raise generations with high moral
values and therefore will directly contribute to the transmission of moral values to
the future. Moreover, a morally correct society depends on the morality of women
themselves. The issue of the headscarf, in addition to being a question of freedom of
religion and conscience, could also be understood from the perspective of morality.
Accordingly, the headscarf in Islam is a commandment which aims at protecting and
glorifying women. The nature of men is a given, according to JDP women: man has
uncontrollable desires. Therefore, it is women’s responsibility to limit themselves in
their relations with the other sex.56 Notwithstanding this ‘given nature of man’ and
the corollary obligation of women to limit their own conduct, the JDP women do not
see Islam as a religion that oppresses women. On the contrary, they believe that
Islam has had a liberating effect on women in both social and political life. At the
basis of this belief lies particularly the idea of the ‘Golden Age of Islam’,
romanticizing the period of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs. Accordingly, in this






























8 period, the Muslim women played an important role in a variety of activities, from
commerce to war, and in all aspects of social life.57 From that time on, however, there
has been an unfortunate backlash in women’s social status due to a ‘misinterpretation
of Islam’ and superstitions. Thus, for the JDP women, the systems of thought and
practice that oppress women go against the very essence of Islam and originate from
its misinterpretation. In fact, they believe that ‘the country which lives Islam in the
most correct way is Turkey’. They point out, however, that, even in Turkey, there has
been a tendency to link some understandings and practices, which despise women and
consider them as second class human beings, to Islam itself. They believe that it is
necessary to know the true teachings of religion and when one closely studies the basic
sources of Islam, it would be easy to see the absence of any prejudice against women
and, on the contrary, Islam acknowledges women’s real worth.
The JDP women believe that while women in Turkey have a higher status and
more rights in society in comparison with the rest of the Muslim world, they are
nevertheless faced with serious difficulties. At this point, it is striking to observe that
in an overall assessment of women’s status in Turkey, while accomplishments and
positive aspects are linked to Islam, problems are seen as independent of it. In other
words, women’s relatively better place in social life is explained by the fact that
‘Turkey is the country where Islam is lived best’. However, the source of the
insurmountable problems of women is ‘misinterpretation’ of Islam, ‘the durability of
values of agricultural society’, the ‘Oriental culture’ and, generally, ‘wrong traditions
and value systems’. When questioned about the accomplishments in women’s rights
in Turkey, there is hardly any reference to the Kemalist reforms of the early
Republic, except for the right of women to elect and to be elected to office in 1934,
long before some European countries. One exception to this general absence of the
acknowledgement of the Republican secular reforms has come from a prominent
JDP woman, also a founding member and a journalist. In an interview on her recent
documentary ‘Behind the Walls: Women in the Muslim World’, Ayşe Böhürler
admitted that the relatively better position of women in Turkish society could be
explained by the early adoption of the secular legal system in Turkey, referring
primarily to the adoption of a secular civil code in 1926. Nevertheless, in line with
other members of the JDP, she maintains that the difficulties women are facing in the
Muslim world do not stem from Islam but from patriarchal interpretations of their
religion, among others.58
Having found a safe refuge in the discourse of conservative democracy, the JDP
nevertheless faces several challenges. First, despite important achievements regard-
ing the women question, obstacles remain for further mobilization in politics for
women. Among the achievements which stand out, one may count especially the
schooling of girls, a willingness to tackle ‘honour’ killings, legal amendments to
achieve gender equality and expand women’s rights and the creation of a vigorous
women’s organization within the party. As to the obstacles, the absence of quotas
and the headscarf issue stand in the way of further mobilization for women in
politics. Except for a vague notion of ‘evolution’ and ‘consensus’, there remains an
ambiguity in the JDP in providing specific policy guidelines to address these issues.
Second, contrasting its policy style to the elitist policy-making of the secular






























8 establishment and basing itself on an overwhelming majority in parliament, the JDP
seems to be tempted by the advantages of majoritarian democracy. Thus, while
criticizing the ‘social engineering’ attitude of the military-bureaucratic elite, they
claim to be the ultimate authority that knows society’s values and demands. These
presumed values are especially relevant to questions of morality which sustain
traditional role models for women. A third and final challenge for the JDP is how to
define conservatism by balancing tradition and change. Tradition as defined by the
JDP’s conservative democracy places women at an intersection of family, Islam and
morality, which together draw the legitimate boundaries of women’s activity. It is
not at all clear how the JDP will manage to balance its discourse of change with its
attachment to tradition.
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oppressive ideas that imprison women to the private sphere can never be civilized], Zaman (daily), 20
February 2006.
41. Headscarf covering the hair, neck and shoulders.
42. The veil, covering the full body except for the face or sometimes even the face.
43. Akdogan, AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi.
44. Ibid.
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